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INTRODUCTION
According to the prevailing view, workplace harassment is sexual in
nature-a male supervisor demanding sexual favors from a female subordi-
nate typically comes to mind.' The law has made major strides in recogniz-
ing and addressing (but not necessarily eradicating) sexual harassment as a
type of workplace discrimination.' Indeed, an entire body of anti-
discrimination law has developed directly to address sexual harassment
claims.' But there is another type of workplace harassment-retaliatory
harassment-which is not based on an exchange of sexual favors. Instead,
retaliatory harassment occurs where workers are purposely targeted for
criticism, ridicule, and abuse for complaining about discrimination Re-
1. In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 12,025
charges of sexual harassment. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sex-
ual Harassment Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2006, http://www.eeo-
c.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
2. By "sexual harassment" I am referring to claims arising under Section 703 of
Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. Section 703 is the
basic provision that lays out illegal behavior under Title VII, making it unlawful for an em-
ployer to discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Section 703 gives rise to three different theories of liability-
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). While
this Article focuses on sexual harassment, harassment as a basis for liability under Title ViI's
substantive anti-discrimination provision is recognized in other contexts, including harass-
ment based on race, national origin, and religion. See, e.g., EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc.,
897 F.2d 1067 (11 th Cir. 1990) (racial harassment); Velez v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 1043
(7th Cir. 2006) (national origin); Turner v. Barr, 811 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (religion).
Also, harassment as a theory of liability is recognized under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Crawford v. Medina Gen.
Hosp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing age harassment under the ADEA); Fox v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing disability harassment under
ADA).
3. Many preeminent scholars have contributed to a growing body of sexual har-
assment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Har-
assment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 (1997); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Pow-
erless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177
(1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467
(1992); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1989).
4. In one case, for example, after complaining of discrimination, an employee was
subjected to taunts from coworkers, calling plaintiff "stupid" and "ignorant." Richardson v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 435 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff alleged she
had to suffer through manure being left in her parking spot, being struck in the head by a
rubber band, having her car scratched, finding hair in her food, and a coworker being warned
not to talk to her. Id. See also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (de-
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taliatory harassment is symptomatic of workplaces that continue to be hos-
tile to traditionally-marginalized groups. Its oppressive impact works just
as insidiously as overt demands for sexual favors do to prevent workplaces
from becoming truly egalitarian in the treatment of workers. Consider the
following:
Cynthia, a parking enforcement officer, is sexually propositioned by
her supervisor. Cynthia reports the incident, her employer investigates, and
the supervisor is eventually fired. So far so good-the law is working as it
should. Cynthia has promptly informed her employer of the harassment and
the employer has promptly responded to her complaint and taken discipli-
nary steps against her harasser. Are Cynthia's troubles over? No. When
Cynthia returns to work, it turns out that her coworkers are displeased that
her complaint resulted in the firing of their buddy. They give her the cold
shoulder. One coworker shouts that Cynthia is the "scum of the earth."
Another proclaims "I smell a rat, do you smell a rat?" And a third coworker
announces in her presence that "a good supervisor had been drummed out of
the office." A new employee is told to "stay away" from Cynthia because
she is "trouble." During the company holiday party, her coworkers take up
a collection for the fired supervisor and waive the money they collect in
Cynthia's face, saying, "Look how much we've collected." Another co-
worker circulates a petition requesting that management terminate Cynthia.
Another coworker refuses to pick her up from her route and yet another
refuses her entry into the company van that is used to transport employees
to their posts. Cynthia eventually quits.
Cynthia later sues for sexual harassment and retaliation. Although the
court agrees that Cynthia was sexually harassed, it finds that she has no
remedy because the employer acted promptly to address the harassment.
The employer investigated and disciplined the offender. Cynthia's retalia-
tion claim fails because the court does not view Cynthia's coworkers' ac-
tions in response to her original sexual harassment claim as rising to the
level of a compensable retaliation claim.5 Cynthia is left out of work and
without remedy. Would another woman in Cynthia's position bother to
report the initial harassment if she anticipated that her coworkers' hostility
scribing plaintiffs allegations that she was publicly berated, and called "rabble rouser" and
"trouble maker" for complaining about sex discrimination).
5. These facts are based loosely on Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir.
2005). The First Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that retaliatory harassment
was not actionable and remanded for a determination of whether the employer was liable for
the retaliatory harassment. Id. While the First Circuit correctly recognizes retaliatory har-
assment as a form of retaliation, instead of treating it as a separate cause of action, the First
Circuit and several other courts respond to claims of retaliatory harassment by importing the
hostile work environment doctrine of discriminatory harassment law into the anti-retaliation
context. Id. at 89 (citing numerous cases from several other circuits standing for this proposi-
tion).
Summer]
Michigan State Law Review
would eventually result in the loss of her job? Most likely not.6 This is not
the outcome that forty years of anti-discrimination law intended. It is this
type of retaliatory harassment-harassment endured by those who oppose
discrimination in the workplace-that is the focus of this Article.
This Article focuses on the legal treatment of retaliatory harassment
claims. It argues that retaliatory harassment is an often misunderstood and
underanalyzed concept in the law of workplace harassment. This Article
seeks to distinguish the legal treatment of retaliatory harassment from sex-
ual harassment. Retaliatory harassment is a conduct-based claim (harass-
ment because one has opposed discrimination). Sexual Harassment, on the
other hand, is a status-based claim (harassment because of one's sex).7 Re-
taliatory harassment presents an analytic challenge because courts treat it as
a hybrid claim-both as a species of retaliation and as analytically similar to
a claim of sexual harassment. It implicates two areas of anti-discrimination
law arising under two different sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: Section 703,8 which prohibits status-based discrimination (dis-
crimination because of one's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin)
and Section 704,9 which prohibits conduct-based discrimination (discrimi-
nation because one opposed status-based discrimination). Because courts
treat retaliatory harassment as a hybrid, they have had great difficulty in
recognizing and addressing retaliatory harassment as a claim distinct from
its legal progenitors-retaliation and sexual harassment."
6. Studies have shown that only a small percentage of women report harassment in
the workplace and many list fear of retaliation as a reason not to report harassment. See
Cynthia Berryman-Fink, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment at Work: Organizational
Policy Versus Employee Practice, EMP. REL. TODAY 57, 59-60 (2001) (citing studies that
show only 2-6 percent of victims of sexual harassment formally report and that many em-
ployees believe filing a complaint amounts to "career suicide").
7. I realize the "status"-"conduct" distinction suffers from its own limitations. All
"status" cases involve conduct in the sense that employers are only liable for their actions.
Discriminatory thoughts without action are not actionable. See Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing congressional intent
behind the passage of the Act). "The legislative history makes it clear that Congress was
attempting to eradicate discriminatory actions in the employment setting, not mere discrimi-
natory thoughts." Id. The relevant difference between "status" and "conduct" cases is the
employer's motivation. In status cases, the employer is motivated to act because of the pro-
tected characteristics-race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In conduct cases, the
employer's action is not necessarily directly linked to the employee's protected status.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Section 703 of Title VII makes it an unlawful em-
ployment practice to fail or refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate against an individual
because of such individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). Section 704 prohibits retaliation against an em-
ployee for opposing discrimination, among other things.
10. See infra Part III. While many of the insights in this Article are equally applica-
ble to claims of racial or other status-based harassment, this Article focuses on sexual har-
assment, which dominates this area of law. Courts' early response was to regard sexual
harassment as being a personal matter, not within the scope of legal inquiry. Therefore,
[Vol. 2007:403
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The relatively thin body of retaliatory harassment literature has fo-
cused on the issue of whether retaliatory harassment can constitute retalia-
tion under Title VII." This Article argues that the Supreme Court decision
in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White1 2 further supports
the contention that retaliatory harassment is a cognizable form of retaliation.
It further suggests that retaliatory harassment should be analyzed as a sepa-
rate method of proving retaliation, similar to how sexual harassment is
treated as a separate method of proving sex discrimination.13 This Article
argues, however, that although analytically similar to sexual harassment,14
retaliatory harassment is not coextensive with sexual harassment and there-
fore must be analyzed with careful attention to the distinctions between
status-based discrimination claims and conduct-based discrimination claims.
Part I describes the use of harassment as a method of enforcing work-
place norms; it details how harassment is used not just to further a worker's
own individual sexist (or racist) agenda, but how it is used to keep women
(and minority groups) in subordinate positions. Part II describes the current
legal frameworks for analyzing workplace harassment cases. Part III dis-
cusses the limits of the current frameworks. Part IV proposes the creation
sexual harassment plaintiffs were rarely successful. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1701-05 (1998). But, ultimately, attitudes about
sex in the workplace changed and courts became more receptive to such claims. Id.
11. See, e.g., Kari Jahnke, Protecting Employees from Employees: Applying Title
VIl's Anti-Retaliation Provision to Coworker Harassment, 19 LAW & INEQ. 101 (2001);
Christopher M. Courts, Note, An Adverse Employment Action-Not Just an Unfriendly Place
to Work: Co-Worker Retaliatory Harassment Under Title VII, 87 IOWA L. REv. 235 (2001);
Howard Zimmerle, Note, Common Sense v. the EEOC: Co- Worker Ostracism and Shunning
as Retaliation under Title VII, 30 J. CORP. L. 627 (2005) (coworker harassment in the form of
simple ostracism not actionable under Title VII); Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Devel-
oping a Consistent Standard for Evaluating a Retaliation Case under Federal and State Civil
Rights Statutes and State Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L.
REv. 359 (2005); Jonathan Gallant, Note, Defining a Retaliatory Adverse Action from
Wideman to Shortz: The Legitimacy of the Eleventh Circuit's Retaliation Case Law, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1079 (2005); Shannon Vincent, Comment, Unbalanced Responses to Employ-
ers Getting Even: The Circuit Split over What Constitutes a Title VII-Prohibited Retaliatory
Adverse Employment Action, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991 (2005).
12. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
13. Susan M. Omilian & Jean P. Kamp, 2 SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION § 22:1 (1998) ("Sexual harassment cases have most often been examined as
disparate treatment cases, but the usual requirement of proof of intent to discriminate has
been modified."); see also Craig v. M&O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007)
(describing the showing required to make out a prima facie case of sexual harassment);
Hoffman-Dombrowski v. Arlington Int'l Racecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2001)
(describing the showing required to make out prima facie case of sex discrimination).
14. The cornerstone of a sexual harassment and retaliatory harassment cases is that
the plaintiff establishes that a hostile work environment existed. It is the source of the hostil-
ity-because of sex in sexual harassment cases and because of opposition to discrimina-
tion-that distinguishes the two causes of action.
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of an independent cause of action for retaliatory harassment and describes
how such a claim would operate.
I. HARASSMENT AS A METHOD OF ENFORCING WORKPLACE NORMS
Workplace harassment, whether explicitly sexual in nature or not, is
an effective tool for enforcing and maintaining workplace norms-norms
that are often white and male. 5 Workplace norms are those behavioral rules
that are enforced by a system of formal and informal sanctions. 6 This sys-
tem of informal sanctions often takes the form of workplace harassment. In
many workplaces, especially traditionally male-dominated workplaces,
workers understand that they must toe the gender line or risk retribution.
These traditionally male-dominated jobs create a work culture hostile
to women. 7 Professor James Gruber argues that "[t]he male traditionality
of an occupation creates a work culture that is an extension of male culture,
and numerical dominance of the workplace by men heightens visibility of,
and hostility toward, women workers who are perceived as violating male
territory."' 8 Not surprisingly, many harassment cases occur when women
attempt to integrate into traditionally male-dominated employment sectors. 9
15. While workplace harassment is often targeted at women, it can be targeted at
men as well, especially men who do not conform to the "masculine" norm. See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (recognizing cause of action for same-
sex sexual harassment under Title VII); see also Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, (Magazine), at 52 (describing various sexually-tinged practices em-
ployed to maintain hyper-masculinized workplaces by enforcing male norms; male workers
indoctrinated through such practices as bagging (grabbing of testicles), sexualized banter
(upbraiding coworkers by use of the feminized insults "little girl" or "whore"), and "goos-
ing" (pinching a man anyplace on his body)); NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN,
WOMEN, AND THE LAW 82-85 (1998) (describing construction of masculinity by exclusion of
femininity at Virginia Military Academy and describing a culture of "adversative" training as
necessary to turn boys into men).
16. Social norms have been defined as "behavioral rule[s] supported by a pattern of
informal sanctions." Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its Im-
plications, 78 TuL. L. REv. 605, 608 (2004).
17. See James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organiza-
tional Policies on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & Soc'Y 301,
301-20 (1998).
18. Id. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
19. Many retaliatory harassment cases, in particular, involve women in traditionally
male-dominated employment sectors, such as law enforcement, manufacturing, and engineer-
ing. See, e.g., Farra v. Gen. Motors Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (sexual
harassment and retaliation claim by female assembly-line worker); Gunnell v. Utah Valley
State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (female employee of university maintenance
staff); Jones v. District of Columbia, 346 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2004), affd in part, revd
in part, 429 F.3d 276 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (female corrections employee); Knox v. Indiana, 93
F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) (female corrections officer); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997) (female mechanic's apprentice);
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The harassment, whether explicitly sexual in nature or not, is often directed
at "holding the gender line" by driving the women out.2" For example, in
Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc.,2 a lone female employee in a cos-
tume-manufacturing shop was subjected to a string of sexual comments,
gestures, and antics "to make her uncomfortable and self-conscious as the
only woman in the workplace."22 Men who fail to conform to gender norms
are also subject to harassment.23
Workplace harassment is an effective mechanism to enforce gender
norms. The threat of sanctions (formal and informal) discourages workers
from coming forward to complain about workplace abuses. Workers often
fail to complain about workplace abuses because they feel powerless to
change their situations. Professors Johnson, Ford, and Kaufman studied
workers' emotional responses to a disagreement over a pay increase and
found that workers who had, or perceived themselves as having, little power
in the workplace were least likely to express negative emotions, such as
anger or resentment.24 The Johnson, Ford, and Kaufman study also found a
correlation between a sense of individual powerlessness and the perceived
power of the wrongdoer.25 When the wrongdoer is infused with an aura of
legitimacy, either through the perceived approval of corporate higher-ups or
coworkers, the employee is discouraged from opposing inequities in the
workplace.26 The study also found that those who occupy the least powerful
positions in the workplace are the least likely to complain.27
Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000) (female employee of
county road department); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (female
parking enforcement officer); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426
(2d Cir. 1999) (female corrections officer); Stutler v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 263 F.3d 698 (7th
Cir. 2001) (female corrections officer); EEOC v. Wyeth, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (N.D. Iowa
2004) (female animal control officer).
20. See, e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 332.
23. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 3, at 696-98 (describing same-sex sexual harass-
ment cases between men as way of policing hetero-masculine gender norms).
24. See Cathryn Johnson et al., Emotional Reactions to Conflict: Do Dependence
and Legitimacy Matter?, 79 Soc. FORCES 107, 124-34 (2000) (arguing that workers' emo-
tional responses to conflict depend on their relative positions within the organization). For
an additional discussion of how retaliation operates in the workplace, see Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 25-36 (2005).
25. See Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 128-32 (describing Emerson's dependence
theory, which states that "the power of actor A over actor B is a function of B's dependence
on A for scarce outcomes, and vice versa").
26. Social scientists who have studied the legitimacy of authority argue that the
validity of the system is maintained by other actors behaving in accord with the system. See
Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 112 (describing literature on legitimating authority, which
shows how authorization (support from those higher up in the organization) and endorsement
(support from peers or subordinates) serve as "mechanisms by which validity prevents
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Although the study did not consider emotional reactions to harassment
per se, clear parallels to harassment in the workplace exist. The Johnson,
Ford, and Kaufman report concludes that those who occupy the least power-
ful positions in the workplace are least likely to complain about workplace
abuses.28 Those in the least powerful positions in the workplace are often
women.29 Women continue to earn less than men do and continue to dis-
proportionately occupy low-level jobs." Their low pay and low status
makes women targets for harassment.3"
The Johnson, Ford, and Kaufman study also concludes that those who
feel powerless are not likely to complain. Studies have shown the debili-
tating psychological effect of sexual harassment on the victim's self-
esteem.33 This feeling of powerlessness may be linked to women's unwill-
change and the stability of authority is maintained"); see also Morris Zelditch, Jr. & Henry
A. Walker, Legitimacy and Stability of Authority, in I ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES:
THEORY AND RESEARCH 1-27 (Lawler, ed. 1984); Henry A. Walker et al., Legitimation, En-
dorsement, and Stability, 64 SOC. FORCES 378 (1986); Henry A. Walker & Morris Zelditch,
Jr., Power, Legitimacy, and the Stability of Authority: A Theoretical Research Program, in
THEORETICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS: STUDIES IN THE GROWTH OF THEORY 364-81 (Berger &
Zelditch eds., 1993). The effect of the legitimizing mechanisms is to produce compliance on
the part of those who privately disagree with the inequalities. Johnson et al., supra note 24, at
112.
27. Johnson et al., supra note 24.
28. Johnson et al., supra note 24.
29. Sex segregation and stratification of the workforce continues with women often
working in "female-dominated" jobs and occupying the lower-level jobs across the spectrum.
See National Organization for Women, Facts About Pay Equity,
http://www.now.org/issues/economic/factsheet.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) [hereinafter
Facts About Pay Equity] (In 2004, fifty-five percent of women worked in "female-
dominated" jobs); Myra H. Strober, Toward a General Theory of Occupational Sex Segrega-
tion: The Case of Public School Teaching, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMEDIES 144 (Barbara F. Reskin ed., 1984) ("[Wlithin any single
occupation, women and men are not distributed equally across the occupational hierarchy-
that is, there is occupational stratification. Women are clustered at the lower levels, men at
the upper levels. And this is often true even in occupations that are overwhelmingly female,
such as teaching and librarianship.").
30. According to the National Organization for Women, in 2004 women earned
$0.76 for every $1.00 earned by men, and the disparity is greater for women of color-
African- American women earned 69 cents for every dollar and Latinas earned 58 cents per
dollar. See Facts About Pay Equity, supra note 29.
31. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., OFFICE OF MERIT SYS. REVIEW & STUDIES,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE, IS IT A PROBLEM? 40 (1981) ("Women in
low-pay and low-status positions are more likely to be harassed . .
32. Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 117.
33. See, e.g., Linda M. Jorgenson & Kathaleen M. Wahl, Workplace Sexual Har-
assment: Incidence, Legal Analysis, and the Role of the Psychiatrist, 8 HARV. REV.
PSYCHIATRY 94-98 (2000) (describing psychological effects of sexual harassment, including
lack of self-esteem, and irritability).
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ingness to complaihi about workplace harassment. For example, only a
small percentage of women report sexual harassment in the workplace.34
A woman's willingness to complain about harassment also appears to
be linked to the perceived power of the harasser within the organizational
structure. Professor James Gruber has found that women's "responses to
harassment are influenced by their perceptions of the level of risk involved
in complaining about harassment, the likelihood that such complaints will
be taken seriously, and the likelihood that the perpetrators will be pun-
ished."35 If the women do not believe that their complaints will be taken
seriously or believe that their perpetrators will be punished, then they are
reluctant to complain.
Organizational behavior theorists demonstrate that power in the work-
place is determined by a combination of dependence and authority. "[T]he
power of actor A over actor B is a function of B's dependence on A ....
The greater B's dependence on A, the greater A's power over B and the
more likely that A can overcome B's resistance."36 A's power over B is
determined by the limits of A's authority-A's ability to issue directives
and expect compliance.37 Professors Zelditch and Walker describe three
sources of support for authority: (1) authorization-meaning support from
higher ups in the organization; (2) endorsement-support from peers and
subordinates; and (3) propriety-support from individual actors.38 In other
words, Actor A can only exercise authority over Actor B with the support of
the other actors-superiors, peers, and subordinates.39 Zelditch and Walker
further demonstrate how authority that is legitimated through authorization,
endorsement, and propriety is used to suppress opposition within the or-
ganization.4" In support of this, Zelditch and Walker "find that inequitable
structures that are endorsed and authorized produce more compliance."41
This power dynamic helps explain how harassment operates in the work-
place.
A harasser derives his power from various sources within the organi-
zation. The harasser can be infused with power directly from the organiza-
tion. This is authorization.4 2 For example, where the harasser is a supervi-
sor, by the nature of his position, he is infused with authority from the or-
34. See Berryman-Fink, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
35. Gruber, supra note 17, at 304.
36. Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 110.
37. Id. ("Authority refers to the right to allocate tasks and sanctions and to expect
compliance with directives that fall within the scope of that authority.")
38. Power, Legitimacy, and the Stability ofAuthority, supra note 26, at 364-81; see
also Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 111.
39. Power, Legitimacy, and the Stability ofAuthority, supra note 26, at 364-81.
40. Id.
41. Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 112.
42. Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 111.
Summer]
Michigan State Law Review
ganization and has the power to affect various aspects of a subordinate's
job. A harasser, who is a peer, rather than a supervisor, can draw power
from these same sources. Although not infused with express power from
the organization, the peer harasser takes cues from the organization's over-
all culture to determine its tolerance of harassment. This could be seen as a
form of indirect authorization. The peer harasser also derives power from
endorsement through the support and complicity of coworkers.
Peer harassment is an important and underanalyzed component in the
maintenance of a woman-unfriendly work environment.43 While support of
coworkers emboldens harassment victims to come forward,' risk of alien-
ation or retaliation by peers impedes victims' willingness to complain.45
Victims fear not only lack of support from coworkers but fear retaliation by
their peers. Peer harassment effectively discourages others from stepping
outside the line. Yet, under the current legal framework, peer harassment is
often difficult to establish.
II. WORKPLACE HARASSMENT: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This Part describes the current legal framework for analyzing work-
place harassment. The law separates workplace harassment into two types:
sexual harassment and retaliatory harassment. This distinction arises as a
result of the statutory language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.46
While the term "harassment" does not appear in the statutory lan-
guage, harassment as a theory of liability has been inferred from the stat-
ute's general prohibition of discrimination (Section 703) 4f and retaliation
(Section 704).48 Sexual harassment theory derives from the language of
Section 703 of Title VII, which makes it unlawful to "discriminate" against
an individual because of such individual's race, color, sex, religion, or na-
tional origin. 49 Retaliatory harassment derives from Section 704 of Title
VII, which makes it unlawful to "discriminate" against an employee or ap-
43. A study of federal employees for the period 1978 to 1994 indicates increasing
incidents of coworker harassment in the workplace in comparison to other forms of harass-
ment. The study further suggests that crude and offensive behavior by coworkers is on the
rise. See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Changing Nature of Employment-
Related Sexual Harassment: Evidence from the US. Federal Government 1978-1994, 57
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 443, 459 (2004).
44. See Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 112 (noting that the level of endorsement by
coworkers affects an employee's willingness to express negative emotions).
45. See Johnson et al., supra note 24, at 131 (arguing that "[r]isk of alienation by
peers may inhibit a subordinate's negative expressions").
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
47. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
48. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
49. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
[Vol. 2007:403
Retaliatory Harassment
plicant "because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employ-
ment practice by this title"5 (meaning those actions prohibited by Section
703).
Part of the difficulty in distinguishing between retaliatory harassment
and sexual harassment stems from the limited terminology used to describe
these actions. Defining the term "discriminate" continues to vex courts and
commentators alike. The term "discriminate" itself has multiple meanings
and encompasses multiple behaviors." A candidate who is passed up for
promotion because she is not "feminine enough,""2 a woman who is sub-
jected to a constant barrage of unwanted sexual attention in the workplace,53
or a woman who is taunted and harassed by her coworkers after she com-
plains of discrimination,54 have all been "discriminated" against.5 But, the
claims are treated as legally distinct. The candidate passed up for promo-
tion has a claim for sex discrimination. The woman subjected to the con-
stant barrage of unwanted sexual attention has a claim for sexual harass-
ment. The employee fired or harassed for opposing discrimination has a
claim for retaliation. Title VII, then, uses the term "discrimination" broadly
to encompass both adverse actions taken because of sex, and adverse ac-
50. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
51. See ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 77
(6th ed. 2003).
52. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (affirming a finding
of gender discrimination where gender played a motivating part in the decision to fail to
promote the employee to partner).
53. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing
hostile work environment sexual harassment as a cognizable claim under Title VII).
54. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 435 (2d Cir.
1999) (recognizing prima facie case of retaliation based on alleged harassment by cowork-
ers).
55. One author discussed whether a statutory prohibition of "discrimination" neces-
sarily includes a prohibition of retaliation for opposing such discrimination where the statu-
tory language itself does not specifically incorporate an anti-retaliation provision. See Brake,
supra note 24, at 21 (arguing in favor of a broader conception of "discrimination" that recog-
nizes retaliation as a form of discrimination). "Theorizing retaliation as a form of discrimi-
nation requires moving beyond discrimination law's current dominant framework of status-
based differential treatment and toward a broader conception that views discrimination as the
maintenance of race and gender privilege." Id. This debate is also taking place in cases
arising under other anti-discrimination statutes such as Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, for example, the Supreme
Court held that prohibition of sex discrimination under Title IX also included a prohibition
against retaliation for opposing sex discrimination, even though the statute did not contain an
explicit anti-retaliation provision. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167
(2005). The Supreme Court also recently granted a petition for certiorari to determine a
similar issue under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Humphries v. CBOCS
W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 75 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. September 25,
2007) (No. 06-1431).
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tions taken in retaliation for opposing discrimination because of sex. But
discrimination "because of sex" is treated differently than discrimination
because one opposed sex discrimination. Adverse treatment "because of
sex" violates Section 703 of Title VII. Adverse treatment because one op-
posed sex discrimination violates Section 704 of Title VII.
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,56 the Su-
preme Court differentiates between actions that give rise to substantive li-
ability under Title VII liability from actions that give rise to claims of re-
taliation. Claims of substantive liability arise under Section 703 of Title
VII. Retaliation claims arise under Section 704. The Supreme Court in
Burlington Northern defines the former as "status-based discrimination"
and the latter as "conduct-based" discrimination. 7 Status-based discrimina-
tion claims are those where the unequal treatment is "because of' the vic-
tim's protected characteristic (race, sex, national origin, or religion). 8 Con-
duct-based discrimination claims are those where a victim is targeted be-
cause she has engaged in conduct in opposition to discrimination. 9 Sexual
harassment is a form of status-based discrimination, while retaliatory har-
assment is a form of conduct-based discrimination.
A. Sexual Harassment as Status-Based Discrimination
This Section traces the development of sexual harassment law under
Section 703 of Title VII. Sexual harassment refers to those situations where
a woman is targeted for harassment because of her status, because she is a
woman.' Sexual harassment violates Section 703 of Title VII, which pro-
hibits discrimination "because of sex. 61
56. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
57. Id. at 2412.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
("The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed." (citation omitted)).
61. In addition to harassment, Section 703 gives rise to two other theories of liabil-
ity-disparate treatment and disparate impact. The term "disparate treatment" generally
refers to cases of intentional discrimination. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) ("'Disparate treatment' such as is alleged in the present case is
the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical .... ); see also Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uni-
form Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563 (1996)
(describing the Supreme Court's use of the term "disparate treatment" to refer to cases of
intentional discrimination). The term "disparate impact" has been used to refer to those
cases where the employer's intent is not the basis of liability. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 33,
n. 15 ("Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate
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Sexual harassment is considered a form of discrimination because it
interferes with a protected employee's terms and conditions of employ-
ment.62 Courts have interpreted the phrase "terms, conditions or privileges
of employment" in Title VII expansively to include within the statute's pro-
active ambit the practice of creating a working environment hostile to tradi-
tionally marginalized groups.63 As one court described: "One can readily
envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as
to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers."'  Subjecting women and minority groups to hostile or of-
fensive environments is "every bit the arbitrary"65 barrier to equality as dis-
crimination is in the hiring or firing of workers.'
Sexual harassment as a form of illegal discrimination appeared some
time after the Court's initial interpretation of Title VII.67 The Court's initial
interpretation focused on eliminating barriers to entry into the market.6"
Once in the workforce, however, these traditionally discriminated-against
groups encountered a myriad of new challenges in the workplace itself.
Women in the workplace faced a range of barriers, including stereotypes
impact.' The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity."). In disparate impact cases, the plaintiff challenges an em-
ployment practice that is facially neutral in its treatment of a protected group but falls more
harshly on a protected group and cannot be justified by a business necessity. For a more
detailed discussion of the development of liability theories, see Rhonda M. Reaves, One of
These Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 839, 858-71 (2004).
62. The statute says:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006).
63. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972); see also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
64. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. Rogers was the first case to recognize a cause of
action based upon a discriminatory work environment. Id.
65. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
66. See ZIMMERETAL.,supra note 51, at 501.
67. . In Meritor Savings Bank the Supreme Court held that harassment because of a
protected characteristic is a form of intentional discrimination actionable under Title VII.
According to the Court, "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." 477 U.S. at
66.
68. See Reaves, supra note 61, at 858-71 (describing the development of the intent
standard).
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about the work they could perform.69 They were often viewed and treated
as sexual objects and as unwanted interlopers in male-dominated work-
places. 7' They had to prove that they could do "men's work," while fending
off advances from men who viewed them merely as sexual objects.7' Other
workplace obstacles included demands for sexual favors, sexist comments,
and other indignities. The harassment theory of liability was developed to
deal with discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.7 2 A
major focus of inquiry in sexual harassment cases is whether the harassment
was "because of' sex; whether, for example, a woman was targeted because
she is a woman, and would not have been targeted if she were a man.73
B. Retaliatory Harassment as Conduct-Based Discrimination
This Section traces the development of retaliatory harassment law un-
der Section 704 of Title VII.74 Retaliatory harassment does not necessarily
target victims because of the victim's status (i.e., gender), but because of the
victim's conduct. It is directed at women (and men) who oppose discrimi-
nation in the workplace. Retaliatory harassment violates Section 704 of
Title VII, which prohibits employers from taking adverse actions against
employees who oppose discrimination in the workplace.75
Conduct-based cases also turn on the issue of intent-whether the em-
ployer had a retaliatory motive. In retaliation cases, an employer's retalia-
tory motive can be inferred from proving that the employee engaged in pro-
tected activity, an adverse action was taken, and there was a causal connec-
69. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 9-23 (1979).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 47-55 (citing to study of Working Women United Institute where
sexually harassed women described feeling humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed,
"cheap," and angry. It also further describes sexual harassment as a form of "social control"
over women, noting that the "costs of endurance can be very high, including physical as well
as psychological damage") Id.; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 114 (1987) ("A major part of the harm of sexual harassment is
the public and private sexualization of a woman against her will.").
72. Harassment as a theory of liability developed later. In Meritor Savings Bank
the Court held that harassment because of a protected characteristic is a form of intentional
discrimination actionable under Title VII. According to the Court, "a plaintiff may establish
a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or
abusive work environment." 477 U.S. at 66.
73. By using the example of a female employee who suffers harassment, I do not by
any means intend to suggest that men cannot face harassment because of their sex-they do.
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (involving a male
victim of sexual harassment).




tion between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.76 In
the classic retaliation situation, for example, an employee is fired for com-
plaining about discrimination in the workplace, the employee must show
that she was engaged in a protected activity (complaining about discrimina-
tion), an adverse action was taken (she was fired), and there was a causal
connection between the two events. But retaliation is not always as appar-
ent as a firing.77 Retaliation can take many forms-poor performance re-
views (suddenly a formerly competent or even outstanding employee is
"problematic" or "below par"), deteriorating work conditions, or unfavor-
able reassignments of job duties. Retaliation increasingly takes the form of
retaliatory harassment.78
III. WORKPLACE HARASSMENT AND THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
Sexual harassment law has made substantial strides in rooting out sub-
tle forms of discrimination that have operated as barriers to keep women out
of male-dominated workplaces.79 Courts have not only outlawed the use of
overt sexual intimidation, but have addressed subtler forms of gendered
harassment that are directed at denying entry to women in traditionally
76. See, e.g., Jennings v. Tinley Park Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 146, 864 F.2d
1368 (7th Cir. 1988).
77. Retaliation continues to be one of the most active areas of discrimination law.
In 2004, 22,740 claims of retaliation were filed with the EEOC. See EEOC, U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Retaliation, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliati-
on.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
78. The EEOC does not separately report statistics for retaliatory harassment, but as
of October 20, 2007, a Westlaw search of the term "retaliatory harassment" retrieved 747
federal cases and 97 state cases in which that phrase was used. A separate search limited to
federal and state labor and employment cases found 729 cases in which the phrase "retalia-
tory harassment" was used. The phrase has been used in 285 federal and state labor and
employment cases in the last three years. See, e.g., Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d
584 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing standard for evaluating retaliatory harassment claims); Hisel
v. City of Clarksville, No. 3:04-0924, 2007 WL 2822098 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2007) (dis-
cussing the standard for evaluating retaliatory harassment claims); Lahar v. Oakland County,
No. 05-72920, 2007 WL 2752350 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21 2007) (discussing standards for
evaluating retaliatory harassment claims).
79. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986), wherein the Court recognized sexual harassment as an illegal form of sex dis-
crimination, many more women have entered traditionally male-dominated job sectors. See,
e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Quick Facts on Nontraditional Occupa-
tions for Women, http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/nontra2006.htm (last visited Nov. 20,
2007) ("As more women enter jobs that were once dominated by men, many jobs that were
nontraditional for women in the 1986 were no longer nontraditional for women in 2006.
Some of these occupations are physicians and surgeons, chemists, judges and magistrates,
announcers, lawyers, athletes, coaches, umpires, and postal service mail carriers.").
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male-dominated workplaces." But the law primarily addresses one mani-
festation-where harassment is targeted at women "because of sex,"8
meaning the individual was targeted because she is a woman, whereas a
similarly situated man would not have been so treated.82
Like sexual harassment, retaliatory harassment presents a substantial
barrier to achieving Title VII's goal of equality.83 These causes of action
often share the same overall goal, driving women out of the workplace. A
lack of protection against retaliatory harassment preserves the gender and
race status quos by discouraging employees from complaining about dis-
crimination in the workplace. Not surprisingly, then, victims of sexual har-
assment are often subjected to retaliatory harassment as well.
Yet, the law has been slow to address retaliatory harassment. In Jones
v. District of Columbia,84 for example, after the plaintiff complained about
sexual harassment in the workplace, she was called a "Red Bitch" and a
"Damn Liar." But, Jones' allegation of sexual harassment and her allega-
tion of retaliatory harassment were treated as separate legal claims.
In Jones, the court analyzed the alleged acts of harassment that oc-
curred after Jones filed her sexual harassment complaint separately and de-
80. The illegal conduct need not be explicitly sexual in nature. Comments that
indicate a general hostility to women in the workplace are also recognized as illegal sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.
1999); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1999); Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202
F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
81. The term "because of sex" has been expanded to include harassment that reflects
a general hostility to women in the workplace, and this theory has been employed success-
fully to address harassment in male-dominated workplaces. See Flockhart v. Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim recognized where plaintiff "called a 'cunt,' 'slut,' 'whore,' and 'bitch'); Dyke v.
McCleave, 79 F. Supp. 2d 98 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989
F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 522 U.S. 997 (1997); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that "evidence that a woman was subjected to a steady stream of vulgar and
offensive epithets because of her gender would be sufficient to establish a claim under Title
VII") (citing Gross v. BurggraffConstr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995)).
82. While this Article focuses on the comparison between sexual harassment and
retaliatory harassment, the same reasoning applies to other forms of "discriminatory harass-
ment," including racial harassment. All forms of discriminatory harassment require a show-
ing that the victim was targeted "because of' her protected status-in sexual harassment
cases, "because of' her sex; in racial harassment cases, "because of her race," etc.
83. As the Supreme Court has described, the overall objective of Title VII is to
secure equal opportunity. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412
(2006). "The anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure that primary objective by preventing.
. employer[s] from interfering ... with an employee's efforts to secure or advance [Title
VII's] basic [equality] guarant[y)." Id.




termined that the post-complaint name-calling was not actionable. "To be
sure, verbal abuse may create a hostile work environment .... That show-
ing, however, is simply not relevant to the retaliation claim."85 Moreover,
presumably because the verbal harassment did not target plaintiff "because
of her sex," but only because she complained, the post-complaint verbal
abuse was not actionable sexual harassment either. 6
A. Retaliatory Harassment and the Limits of Retaliation Law
Currently, courts do not consistently recognize retaliatory harassment
as a separate method of proving illegal retaliation.87 Instead, retaliatory
harassment claims are analyzed as if they were any other retaliation claim.
For example, many courts require the plaintiff in a retaliatory harassment
case to follow the same analytical framework as a typical retaliation claim,
which means that the plaintiff must show that she engaged in a protected
activity, the employer took an "adverse action" against her, and there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employ-
ment action.8
1. Defining an "Adverse Action"
The legal framework for establishing a retaliation claim is based on
the existence of an adverse action. This Section traces courts varied defini-
tion of an "adverse action." Section 704 of Title VII, which prohibits re-
taliation, provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
85. Id. (post-complaint verbal abuse (referring to complainant as "Red Bitch" and a
"Damn Liar") not "relevant" to showing of retaliation). Hostile work environment cases
based purely on verbal harassment can also raise First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., An-
drea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amend-
ment: Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67 (2002); Suzanne San-
gree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First
Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461 (1995).
86. Jones, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
87. Compare Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing claim for retaliatory harassment); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't Corr. Serv.,
180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing a claim for retaliatory harassment); Gunnell v.
Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing a claim for retaliatory
harassment); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (recognizing a claim for
retaliatory harassment), with Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997) (recognizing no claim for retaliatory harassment).
88. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
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because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
89
To make out a claim for retaliation, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer had a retaliatory intent and that the employer took an adverse ac-
tion because of the employee's protected conduct (opposing discrimina-
tion).9° The limits of oppositional conduct, then, are determined, in part, by
the parameters of the definition of an adverse action. But what types of
actions are sufficiently injurious to rise to the level of a substantive viola-
tion?
a. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White"'
In the recently decided case Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White,9" the United States Supreme Court sought to clarify the defini-
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). The anti-retaliation doctrine consists of two
provisions termed the "opposition clause" and the "free access" clause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
(2006); see also Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1998)
("Protected activity under Title VII is divided into two categories, opposition and participa-
tion."). The Opposition Clause ("because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice") protects a variety of conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). The
Free Access Clause ("because he has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing") protects the employee's ability to freely
participate in Title VII proceedings. Id.; see Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (describing the differences between the Participation
Clause and the Opposition Clause). In general, courts grant less protection for actions under
the Opposition Clause than the Free Access Clause. Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312. Courts grant
near absolute protection under the Free Access Clause because it is narrower in scope, and it
encourages employees to file charges. Id. It is narrower in scope because it applies to re-
taliation that relates in some way to the filing of a discrimination charge. Id. Since opposi-
tional conduct is not related to a legal proceeding, it can look more like insubordination or
other inappropriate behavior rather than vindicating a legal right; for example, refusing to
remain silent about the harassment of others is protected, but calling your boss a "jerk" be-
cause he rooted against your favorite team is not. Therefore, "[c]ourts are required 'to bal-
ance the purpose of [Title VII] to protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing.
. discrimination, against Congress' ... desire not to tie the hands of employers in the selec-
tion and control of personnel."' Id. (quoting Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental
Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976)). This Article focuses on oppositional conduct.
90. Intent in retaliation cases is generally proved using the same proof structures
adopted to prove the underlying claim of status-based discrimination. See Jennings v. Tinley
Park Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 146, 864 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1988). It is not yet clear
whether systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact applies in retaliation cases. But
there appears to be no reason that they could not. For example, an employer that engages in
a pattern and practice of discrimination against those who engage in protected conduct or an
employer who adopts a neutral policy that adversely impacts persons who engage in pro-
tected conduct may be in violation of the anti-retaliation provisions.




tion of an adverse action and to provide some much-needed guidance to
courts in determining what acts constitute illegal retaliation.
In Burlington Northern, a female forklift operator for a railroad ac-
cused her supervisor of sexual harassment. " The plaintiff alleged that her
supervisor "repeatedly told her that women should not be working" in the
department and made "insulting and inappropriate remarks to her in front of
her male colleagues."'94 White alleged that after she complained, she was
retaliated against-she was reassigned to a more arduous job and later was
suspended without pay for thirty-seven days for insubordination.9
The Burlington Northern Court addressed two issues: (1) whether re-
taliation claims must be limited to those actions that are related to employ-
ment or occur at the workplace, and (2) what employer actions are suffi-
ciently injurious to constitute retaliation in violation of Section 704. The
Court held that retaliatory acts are not limited to employment-related acts.
It further defined retaliatory acts as those employer actions that would be
"materially adverse" to a reasonable person.96 It further stated that "materi-
ality" includes actions likely to deter victims from complaining.97
The Court rejected the idea that only ultimate employment decisions
are actionable, as was held by some circuits.98 And, while it agreed that
some standard of materiality must be observed, it rejected the notion that
material acts must be specifically work-related acts. Instead, the Court ex-
panded the scope of "material" acts to include any action that "well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.""
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2415.
95. White alleged that she was removed from forklift duty after she complained of
sexual harassment. Id. at 2409. This reassignment was the basis of White's first complaint
to the EEOC. Id. She alleged that the reassignment was unlawful gender discrimination and
retaliation. White then claimed that after she filed the initial complaint of retaliation she was
again retaliated against when she was suspended without pay for insubordination. Id. White
filed a second EEOC complaint alleging retaliation based on the suspension without pay. Id.
96. Id. at 2415.
97. Id. "In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse .... We speak of material adversity because
we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harm." Id.
98. Id. at 2414. The Court abrogated the holdings in Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243
F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997);
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932
(1997); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins., 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997).
99. See Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d
1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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b. Adverse Actions Post-Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White
Burlington Northern rejects the standard for defining an "adverse ac-
tion" that was applied in many of the prior circuit cases and calls into ques-
tion the results in others. Prior to Burlington Northern, the circuits were
split on what constituted an adverse action. Courts followed three ap-
proaches to defining "adverse actions" for retaliation purposes. Some de-
fined an "adverse action" as any action "reasonably likely to deter" a dis-
crimination complaint; 0 others defined an "adverse action" as any act that
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment; ' yet others
limited the definition of "adverse action" to "ultimate employment ac-
tions."'"2  The Fifth0 3 and Eighth Circuits"° adopted the most restrictive
view, that only "ultimate employment actions" were actionable. 5 "Ulti-
mate employment actions" included actions such as hiring, firing, promot-
ing, or demoting, but did not include actions such as written reprimands..6
100. Actions that are "reasonably likely to deter" an employee from complaining
about discrimination include actions that do not "materially" affect the terms and conditions
of employment, such as lateral transfers and negative performance ratings. See infra notes
108-10 and accompanying text.
101. Harassment by coworkers, unjustified discipline, and a refusal to transfer can
constitute adverse actions. These courts further delineate between "material" acts that are
related to employment or occur at the workplace. See, e.g., Washington v. Ill. Dep't of
Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Rochon v. Gonzales 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
102. See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
103. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 932 (1997); Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that only ultimate employment decisions constitute adverse employment actions);
Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that adverse employ-
ment actions are limited to ultimate employment decisions).
104. See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
that while the action complained of may have had "a. tangential effect on her employment, it
did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision intended to be actionable under
Title VII"). More recently the Eighth Circuit has begun to abandon the "ultimate decision"
language in favor of "materially affects" language. See, e.g., Henthom v. Capitol
Commc'ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004) (saying that "a material change in
employment, 'such as a change in salary, benefits or responsibilities' constitutes an adverse
employment action). Duncan v. Delta Consol. Indus., 371 F.3d 1020, 1026-27 (8th Cir.
2004) (requiring "a tangible change in working conditions that produces a material employ-
ment disadvantage") (quoting Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850,
853 (8th Cir. 2000)); Bradley v. Widnall, 232 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2000) ("An adverse
employment action is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage, such as a change in
salary, benefits, or responsibilities.").
105. See Henthorn, 359 F.3d at 1028.
106. See, e.g., Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a written reprimand is not an ultimate employment decision).
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or retaliatory harassment. °7 The Seventh" 8 and Ninth Circuits'09 were at the
other end of the spectrum, adopting an even more expansive view of "ad-
verse employment action." In those circuits, an adverse action was any
action that was .'reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in a
protected activity.""'" Such actions included lateral transfers, negative per-
formance ratings, exclusion from meetings, and denial of support services.
Increasingly, the consensus among courts was for an intermediate view de-
fining an adverse action as an act that "materially affects" the terms and
conditions of employment."' The First,"2 Second,"3 Third,"' Fourth,"5
107. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (saying hostility by coworkers in reaction to dis-
crimination complaint is not an adverse employment action).
108. See Washington v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005);
Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d
892 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1004 (2003) (saying employment action is ad-
verse if it makes the employee worse off); McGuire v. City of Springfield, 280 F.3d 794 (7th
Cir. 2002).
109. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004),
reh 'g denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing an adverse employment action as one
that is reasonably likely to deter; but mere ostracism is not enough); Manatt v. Bank of
America, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 965 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir.
2000)). Some scholars have argued that the intermediate and expansive views are more
consistent with Title VII's statutory language and goals. Compare Michel Rusie, The Mean-
ing of Adverse Employment Actions in the Context of Title VII Retaliation Claims, 9 WASH. J.
L. & POL'Y 379 (arguing that the materially affects test strikes the appropriate balance be-
tween effectuating the statutory purpose and protecting employers from frivolous suits), with
Joel A. Kravetz, Deterrence v. Material Harm: Finding the Appropriate Standard to Define
an "Adverse Action" in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Statutes, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315 (2002) (arguing in favor of univer-
sal adoption of the reasonable deterrence standard).
111. See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Hemandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47
(1st Cir. 1998) (adverse actions include disadvantageous transfers, unwarranted negative job
evaluations, and toleration of harassment by other employees).
113. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.
1999) ("[A] plaintiff may suffer an 'adverse employment action' if she endures a 'materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment."') (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116
F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997)); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 997 (1997) (adopting the materially adverse change standard); McKenney v. N.Y.
City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (saying no retaliation
occurs unless there is a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions).
114. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (saying
retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee's compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
115. See Von Guten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2001) (saying an
adverse action must affect "terms, conditions, or benefits" of employment).
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Sixth,"6 Tenth, "7 Eleventh,"8 and D.C."9 Circuits followed the intermediate
view and defined an adverse employment action as an action that "materi-
ally affected" the terms and conditions of employment.1 ° Examples in-
cluded termination, demotion evidenced by a pay cut, "a less-distinguished
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsi-
bilities, or other indices. "..
Burlington Northern rejects the "ultimate decision test" to adverse ac-
tions. 22 It also effectively criticizes those circuits that applied an "interme-
116. The Sixth Circuit appears to follow this intermediate standard as well. See Bar-
ton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 904 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (asserting that an
employee must show significant change in employment status); Morris v. Oldham County
Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000) (saying severe or pervasive harassment can
constitute an adverse action).
117. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998)
(adopting a liberal interpretation of adverse action).
118. See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (1lth Cir. 1998)
("We join the majority of circuits which have addressed the issue and hold that Title VII's
protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to adverse actions which fall short of
ultimate employment decisions."). But cf Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587
(11 th Cir. 2000), reh'g denied, 229 F.3d 1171 (1 1th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1076
(2001) ("An adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision, such as dis-
charge or failure to hire, or other conduct that 'alters the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities,
or adversely affects his or her status as an employee."') (quoting Robinson v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
119. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Note that
although the D.C. Circuit adopted a materially affects standard, it defined materiality more
broadly to include any action likely to deter victims from complaining. Id. at 1217-18.
120. Even courts in circuits that initially applied one of the other tests increasingly
use language to suggest that they follow the intermediate standard. The Eighth Circuit, for
example, has begun to abandon the "ultimate decision" language in favor of "materially
affects" language. See, e.g., Henthom v. Capitol Commc'ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir.
2004) (holding that a material change in employment, such as change in salary, benefits, or
responsibilities, is an adverse employment action). The consolidation appears to be as a
result of courts' interpretation of the Supreme Court opinion in Burlington Industries v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), in which the Court recognized an affirmative defense to liabil-
ity for hostile work environment harassment by a supervisor. Courts have also adopted the
Ellerth defense in other non-sexual harassment cases, including constructive discharge cases
and retaliatory harassment cases. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)
(recognizing the affirmative defense in constructive discharge cases); Morris v. Oldham
County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the affirmative defense
in retaliatory harassment cases). See, e.g., Washington v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d
658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1217-18.
121. See Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2002). A materially
adverse employment action must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an altera-
tion ofjob responsibilities. Id. (citing Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)).
122. "We therefore reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals... that have
limited actionable retaliation to so-called 'ultimate employment decisions."' Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412, 2414 (2006). Prior to Burlington North-
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diate" standard, which limited adverse actions to those that materially af-
fected the "compensation, terms and benefits" of employment. The Court
did this by specifically rejecting the notion that adverse actions are limited
to employment or workplace actions.'23
Burlington Northern calls into question some aspects of the "liberal
view," which defined an adverse action as any action "reasonably likely to
deter" a victim from complaining as well. The Court required that an ad-
verse action meet some standard of substantiality. In effect, the Court ap-
proved a standard that relied on concepts both from the "intermediate view"
and from the "liberal view" of adverse actions. This new clarity from the
Supreme Court should help get lower courts to recognize retaliatory har-
assment as actionable retaliation.
2. Retaliatory Harassment as an "Adverse Action"
This Subsection discusses whether retaliatory harassment is actionable
under Burlington Northern's newly articulated standard for adverse action.
It first describes how retaliatory harassment claims were treated in the
courts prior to Burlington Northern. It then discusses the likely affect of the
Burlington Northern decision on future retaliatory harassment cases.
A review of lower court decisions rendered prior to Burlington North-
ern reveals that courts have taken a patchwork approach to retaliatory har-
assment claims.'24 Some courts acknowledged that retaliatory harassment
can constitute an "adverse action" while others did not. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, refused to recognize retaliatory harassment as an adverse em-
ployment action. In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company,'25 the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that retaliatory harassment was not actionable retaliation:
"Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxi-
ety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and
therefore are not the required adverse employment actions."'26
ern, two circuits-the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits-held that only ultimate employment
actions were actionable. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
123. Burlington N., 126 S. Ct. at 2414. "We therefore reject the standards applied in
the Courts of Appeal that have treated the anti-retaliation provision as forbidding the same
conduct prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision.... Id.
124. Some, but not all, courts consider retaliatory harassment to be an "adverse ac-
tion" for retaliation purposes. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180
F.3d 426, 445 (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing district court grant of summary judgment dismissing
retaliatory harassment claim and acknowledging disagreement within the courts about
whether retaliatory harassment by coworkers can constitute actionable retaliation).
125. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997).
126. Id. at 707.
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Other courts recognized retaliatory harassment as actionable retalia-
tion. In Ray v. Henderson,127 an employee who complained about the treat-
ment of women in the workplace was publicly berated by being called a
"rabble rouser" and "troublemaker." The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
retaliatory harassment was actionable: "We agree with our sister circuits.
Harassment is obviously actionable when based on race and gender. Har-
assment as retaliation for engaging in protected activity should be no differ-
ent.
1 28
The parties in Burlington Northern did not raise, and the Court did not
specifically address, claims of retaliatory harassment. Nevertheless, retalia-
tory harassment claims should fall within the Court's newly articulated defi-
nition of a retaliatory action-materially adverse acts that dissuade a rea-
sonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.
The reasoning of the Burlington Northern opinion supports the view
that retaliatory harassment is an adverse action for retaliation purposes.
The Court defined an adverse action as those employer actions that would
be "materially adverse" to a reasonable person, meaning likely to deter vic-
tims from complaining.1 29  While the Burlington Northern Court distin-
guishes between material retaliatory acts, which are covered by the statute,
and trivial or insignificant acts, which are not, it acknowledges that the con-
text in which the acts occur matters. For example, the Court stated that "an
employee's decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that
employee from those petty slight or minor annoyances that often take place
at work that all employees experience."' 30 It went on to recognize that "the
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the par-
ticular circumstances."'' The Court limits protection to materially adverse
action, those likely to deter a reasonable worker. Retaliatory harassment is
such an act.
Retaliatory harassment is far from inconsequential or a minor annoy-
ance. Instead, it is quite effective in deterring workplace complaints. For
example, in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company,'32 the Fifth Circuit re-
versed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of retaliation. In
Mattern, the plaintiff alleged that coworkers became hostile to her, and they
"would not say 'hello', and would mutter 'accidents happen. '""'" One su-
pervisor said he would fire her. She also alleged that her locker was broken
into and some of her tools were stolen. The Fifth Circuit determined that
127. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 1245.
129. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
130. See id
131. Id.
132. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997).
133. Id. at 705.
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the plaintiff did not suffer retaliatory harassment as a matter of law. Under
the Supreme Court's new standard articulated in Burlington Northern, the
plaintiff would have a much stronger argument that the jury verdict should
not have been reversed.
Retaliatory harassment claims also likely meet the Supreme Court's
"reasonable worker" standard. In Burlington Northern, the Court applies a
"reasonable worker" standard. Only those actions likely to deter a "reason-
able" worker will fit the Court's newly articulated standard. As discussed in
Part I, actions of coworkers in response to discrimination in the workplace
have a powerful effect on discrimination victims' willingness to complain.
Many women are reluctant to report sexual harassment for fear of retalia-
tion.'34 For already marginalized workers, even seemingly minor changes in
the workplace environment can have a significant impact.'
B. Retaliatory Harassment and the Limits of Sexual Harassment Law
This Section describes the limits of the courts' current approach to
analyzing retaliatory harassment cases. It asserts that when analyzing re-
taliatory harassment cases, rather than merely importing standards from
sexual harassment law, courts should recognize retaliatory harassment as a
distinct legal claim. Courts tend to view retaliatory harassment claims
through the legal lens of sexual harassment law, often losing sight of the
important legal distinctions between retaliatory harassment claims and sex-
ual harassment claims.'36 Borrowing standards from sexual harassment law
to address retaliatory harassment claims further confuses an already com-
plex area of the law.
1. Defining a Hostile Work Environment
Victims of retaliatory harassment must show that they were subjected
to a "hostile" work environment." 7 This requirement of showing a hostile
environment derives from sexual harassment cases.
To establish a hostile work environment in a sexual harassment case,
the complainant must show that the actions taken against her were suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive so as to alter her working conditions and create
134. See Berryman-Fink, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
135. A body of medical and social science literature documents the physical and
psychological effects of discrimination on African Americans, for example. See, e.g., Terry
Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REv. 529 (2003).
136, See infra note 138-39 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92 (1st Cir. 2005), Ray v.
Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000).
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an abusive environment.138 Those courts that recognize retaliatory harass-
ment as potentially actionable retaliation rely heavily on sexual harassment
law to determine when retaliatory harassment is sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to sustain a claim.'39 This was the approach of the First Circuit in
Noviello v. City of Boston.140
The Noviello Court reasoned that since a retaliatory act must "rise to
some level of substantiality," then in a retaliatory harassment case the "hos-
tile work environment doctrine" from sexual harassment law embodied that
principle."4  The court, therefore, imported the hostile work environment
standard to analyze a retaliatory harassment case.'42 The Ninth Circuit in
Ray v. Henderson"'3 similarly imported the standard from sexual harassment
cases to analyze retaliatory harassment cases: "[Retaliatory h]arassment is
actionable only if it is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.""'
Requiring retaliatory harassment to meet sexual harassment law stan-
dards gives rise to two problems: (1) it adopts an already flawed structure;
138. Sexual harassment can also be proved under the quid pro quo theory of liability.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs in those situations where the acceptance of unwel-
come sexual conduct is a condition of an employment benefit. Because it is so closely tied to
demands for sexual favors, quid pro quo harassment is generally thought to be a theory
unique to sexual harassment law and, therefore, not generally used to analyze other forms of
discriminatory harassment, such as racial harassment. Clemons v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.
Supp. 2d 469 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (allowing no quid pro quo theory of racial harassment);
Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir. 1996) (no quid pro quo theory);
Wright-Simmons v. City of Oklahoma City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing
no quid pro quo theory); see also Tam B. Tran, Comment, Title VII Hostile Work Environ-
ment: A Different Perspective, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (1998); Eileen B. Goldsmith,
God's House or the Law 's, 108 YALE L.J. 1433 (1999) (quid pro quo seemed so inextricable
from sexuality that its relevance to other cases is almost entirely overlooked). But cf Vent-
ers v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying quid pro quo theory to racial
harassment); Summi Cho, "Racial Favors ": The Tangibility of Racial Harassment and the
Quid Pro Quo Analogy (arguing in favor of applying quid pro quo theory in racial harass-
ment cases) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
139. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[W]e
hold that the 'adverse employment action' element of a retaliation plaintiff's prima facie case
incorporates the same requirement that the retaliatory conduct rise to the level of [a sexual
harassment claim].").
140. 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005).
141. Id. at 92.
142. Id. "In order to prove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that she
was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that materially altered the conditions of her
employment .... This framework is readily transferable to the retaliatory harassment con-
text." Id.
143. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
144. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harris v. Fork-
lift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993)).
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and (2) it ignores important policy distinctions between anti-discrimination
law and retaliation law. The result is that current interpretations of stan-
dards of retaliatory harassment effectively raise the bar of conduct subject to
legal correction, potentially eliminating a wide swath of retaliatory conduct
from the scope of the law.'45
2. Retaliatory Aspects of Sexual Harassment
This Subsection describes the limitations of using the sexual harass-
ment framework to analyze retaliatory harassment claims. One limitation of
using the sexual harassment framework to analyze retaliatory harassment
claims is that the sexual harassment framework already ignores the retalia-
tory nature of much conduct described as "sexual harassment."
While sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, it can also be
a form of retaliation. It can be both a "gendered" harm (an action taken
against a person because she is a woman) as well as an act of retaliation for
stepping outside workplace norms.'46 For example, a supervisor who retali-
ates against an employee for the employee's refusal to succumb to the su-
pervisor's unwanted advance by taking away a job benefit or by inflicting a
job detriment retaliates against the employee for resisting sexism in the
workplace.'47 Yet, the law of sexual harassment fails to explicitly address
the "retaliatory" aspect of such harassment. Instead, the law treats this type
of harassment as solely a form of status-based discrimination, the retaliatory
aspects of sexual harassment are not separately addressed.
The analytic framework for sexual harassment cases arose in the spe-
cific and special context of addressing and eliminating sex discrimination,
and out of the pioneering work of Professor Catherine MacKinnon. She
argued that sexual harassment existed as another method of reinforcing
women's traditionally inferior role in the workplace.'48 As a result of Pro-
145. The Sixth Circuit defines an "adverse action" as one that materially affects an
employee's terms or conditions of employment. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
310 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff'd, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (affirming result but
rejecting argument that adverse action require a link between the retaliatory action and the
terms, conditions, or status of employment). Elsewhere, the Sixth Circuit has allowed em-
ployers to assert an affirmative defense to a charge of retaliatory harassment. See Morris v.
Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000). Both the standard of liability
and the standard of employer liability in these cases rely heavily on similar concepts from
sexual harassment law.
146. See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 69, at
25-47.
147. Id. at 35.
148. See generally MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra
note 69.
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fessor MacKinnon's work, two distinct theories of liability, quid pro quo 149
and hostile work environment,"5° were devised to address sexual harassment
in the workplace. 5' Although there is some doubt about the continuing va-
lidity of Professor MacKinnon's bilateral classifications of sexual harass-
ment as either quid pro quo or hostile work environment, the distinction
remains useful for some purposes.'52
As Professor MacKinnon described, quid pro quo sexual harassment
occurs when the acceptance of unwelcome sexual conduct is a condition of
an employment benefit.' 3 Professor MacKinnon's second theory of illegal
harassment-hostile work environment--differs from quid pro quo in that
the harasser lacks the authority to take direct job action. Hostile work envi-
ronment harassment covers situations where the job consequence is indi-
rect.'54 There is no direct threat to employment ("comply or else") but there
is general hostility in the workplace.'
Hostile work environment harassment recognizes that hostility within
the workplace can have a similar effect on the victim's job; it can make
work conditions so unpleasant as to affect the employee's terms and condi-
tions of work. It is a more subtle form of preventing women from achieving
equality in the workplace. Instead of directly conditioning work benefits on
succumbing to advances, it imposes a "blanket of oppression." '56
MacKinnon acknowledged that sexual harassment often has a retalia-
tory component as well. For example, in those quid pro quo situations
where a woman's refusal to "play along" with a supervisor's demand for
149. Professor MacKinnon argued that the quid pro quo theory was necessary to fill a
perceived gap in traditional tort law. Traditional tort law, she argued, was inadequate to
address problems of sexual harassment because it viewed the harm as an individual rather
than a group injury (to women based on their status as women). Id. at 171-74.
150. See id. at 32 (describing two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and
hostile work environment). There is little functional difference between the two types of
harassment-quid pro quo and hostile work environment-from the victim's perspective, the
injury is the same. Yet, the standard of employer liability is different.
151. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
152. While both theories were discussed by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Court questioned the continuing utility of the dis-
tinction between the two theories of liability in the more recent case, Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). In Ellerth, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
acknowledged, however, that the distinction may be helpful in "making a rough demarcation
between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are absent
altogether." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
153. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 69, at 32-
40.
154. Id. at 40-47.
155. Id.
156. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (requiring plain-




sexual favors leads to a "significant change in employment status," '157 it is
not just the demand for sexual favors that can cause injury, but the retalia-
tion for failing to succumb to the demand that can cause specific, job-related
injuries. 58 Yet, the retaliatory nature of quid pro quo harassment was not
explicitly recognized in the resulting legal framework courts later adopted.
To establish quid pro quo harassment, the plaintiff must establish that a su-
pervisor took a "tangible employment action" against her because of her
sex. The requirement that quid pro quo harassment involve a "tangible em-
ployment action" may tacitly acknowledge, however, that such claims have
a retaliatory component.159
Sexual harassment that takes the form of hostile work environment
harassment may also have an unstated retaliatory aspect. For example,
some hostile work environment cases are triggered by male coworkers who
are upset at the audacity of women who enter a traditionally-male work-
place. 6° The resulting negative actions by the coworkers can be seen as
retaliatory in nature. They are not retaliating just because an employee
overtly complains about discrimination in the workplace, but are acting in
retaliation against an employee who challenges a male-dominated work-
place. The analytic framework of hostile work environment cases makes no
mention of the retaliatory aspect of some harassment; instead, it focuses on
157. A tangible employment action is a "significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsi-
bilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits," so unfulfilled threats are not
tangible employment actions. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
158. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that "tangible employment action" describes
acts taken by a supervisor that affect substantive job rights). Tangible employment actions
are limited to those with direct job consequences. Id. at 761.
159. The requirement that plaintiff prove that the sexual harassment involved a "tan-
gible employment action" is unique to quid pro quo sexual harassment cases. Where a "tan-
gible employment action" is proved, the employer is held to a standard of strict liability and
can offer no affirmative defense to liability. The increased responsibility for employers in
quid pro quo cases tacitly acknowledges that the harasser's ability to follow through on a
threat of a job sanction if the plaintiff fails to comply with the sexual demand arises from the
power given to the harasser by the employer. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. A similar concept
exists under the law of retaliation. In a retaliation case, the plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer took an "adverse action" against her. The concept of an "adverse action" overlaps
with, but is broader than the concept of a "tangible employment action." An "adverse ac-
tion," unlike a "tangible employment action," is not limited to only those job actions taken
by a supervisor as a direct result of the authority delegated to him by the employer, it in-
cludes any adverse action, whether explicitly job related or not, that "materially affects" a
reasonable worker. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern, some
circuits narrowed the definition of "adverse action" to "ultimate employment decision,"
making the "adverse action" standard under retaliation law similar to the "tangible employ-
ment action" standard of harassment law. See supra notes 103-05.
160. See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
off'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir.
1999).
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whether unwelcome sexual conduct is so severe and pervasive as to alter the
employment conditions. 6' Using the sexual harassment framework as a
basis to analyze retaliatory harassment exacerbates the problem.
3. Status versus Conduct as a Basis for Liability
Importing standards from sexual harassment law to analyze retaliatory
harassment claims also diminishes the important policy distinctions between
anti-discrimination law and anti-retaliation law. In some sense, the goal of
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is broader than its substantive anti-
discrimination provisions. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is not di-
rected narrowly at just preventing discrimination against individuals be-
cause of their protected status, but reaches more broadly to address the other
systems that help perpetuate inequality in the workplace, including those
that seek to intimidate those who would otherwise oppose discriminatory
practices. '62
The Supreme Court recognized in Burlington Northern that the dis-
tinction between Title VII's substantive anti-discrimination provision and
its anti-retaliation provision is significant:'63 "The substantive provision [of
Title VII] seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e.,
their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to indi-
viduals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct."'" Anti-retaliation law
supports anti-discrimination law by encouraging victims to come forward
and report acts of discrimination by protecting them from any adverse con-
sequences of reporting. As the Supreme Court described, "the anti-
retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an
employee's efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the [anti-
discrimination law's] basic guarantees."' 65 Ending retaliatory harassment,
then, is an important step in ending workplace discrimination. That distinc-
tion disappears/dissolves when courts conflate the two provisions into one
analytic framework.
161. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Not all offensive
or objectionable behavior in the workplace creates a hostile work environment. The behavior
must be sufficiently "severe or pervasive" so as to alter work conditions. The "severity or
pervasiveness" of the harassment distinguishes a "hostile work environment" from an un-
pleasant, but nevertheless non-discriminatory work environment. The compromise addresses
the concern that Title VII not become a "general civility code of for the American work-
place." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Therefore, only a
discriminatory environment that is so "severe or pervasive" as to alter the terms of the em-
ployment relationship is prohibited by law. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
162. Brake, supra note 24, at 18.
163. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006).
164. Id. at 2412.




This Article suggests that the creation of a separate retaliatory harass-
ment cause of action under a distinct analytic framework is necessary to
address the subtle ways harassment is employed in the workplace.' 66
Recognition of retaliatory harassment claims will necessitate applying
a framework different from that applied in garden variety retaliation claims.
In retaliation cases, the complainant generally must prove that she engaged
in a protected activity, that the employer took an adverse action against her,
and that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse
action. Some courts have already acknowledged that a new framework is
necessary to address retaliatory harassment claims. In Morris v. Oldham
County Fiscal Court,'67 for example, the Sixth Circuit modified the standard
for proving a prima facie case of retaliation to include cases where retalia-
tory harassment is alleged.
"[W]e today modify our standard for proving a prima facie case of Title VII re-
taliation. A plaintiff must now prove that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by
Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected rights was known to defendant; (3) defen-
dant thereafter took adverse employment action against the plaintiff, or the plaintiff
was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and
(4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action or harassment." 1
68
This Proposal recommends that more courts follow the Sixth Circuit's lead
and treat retaliatory harassment as another way of proving illegal retaliation.
This proposed framework would also require courts to interpret the
phrase "severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment" differently from how
courts interpret similar language in sexual harassment cases. In sexual har-
assment cases, only those actions that "alter working conditions" are severe
or pervasive enough to give rise to a sexual harassment claim. Many courts
incorrectly hold complainants in retaliatory harassment cases to this same
standard (severe or pervasive enough to alter work conditions). In light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern, this interpretation is
surely incorrect. The Court explicitly rejects the notion that actionable re-
166. I realize that some may argue that the solution to these problems is to analyze
retaliatory harassment claims just as a court would analyze sexual harassment claims. In
other words, first, courts would determine whether the harassment "materially affects" the
employee's continued employment. If it does, the employer would be liable unless it can
prove as an affirmative defense that it took steps to correct the behavior. This seems to be
the direction that courts are headed in (although many apply the standard incorrectly). See
supra Part III and accompanying notes. As discussed in Section I1I.B supra, merely adopt-
ing the sexual harassment analytic framework creates problems at the theoretical and practi-
cal levels.
167. 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000)
168. Id.
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taliation must affect working conditions. It follows, then, that retaliatory
harassment, which is a form of retaliation, need not alter working conditions
to be actionable. In a retaliatory harassment case, a hostile work environ-
ment would be established where the plaintiff can show that the actions
would deter a reasonable plaintiff from opposing discrimination. Whereas
in sexual harassment cases, only conduct that rises to a level so as to alter
work conditions is actionable, in retaliatory harassment cases, actionable
conduct would extend to any action that would deter a reasonable plaintiff
from opposing discrimination.69 This interpretation is consistent with the
distinction recognized by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern, that
retaliatory conduct encompasses a wider range of behavior than substantive
discrimination claims. Returning to the opening hypothetical of Cynthia,
the parking enforcement officer, the post-complaint conduct would be sub-
jected to a reasonably likely to deter standard. Under such a standard, a
factfinder could determine that coworkers giving her the cold shoulder, call-
ing her names, and circulating a petition to get her fired, were calculated to
deter future complaints, and thus constituted actionable retaliatory harass-
ment.
CONCLUSION
Retaliatory harassment represents a substantial barrier to equality in
the workplace. It is a way of enforcing workplace norms-setting the
boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable workplace behavior, and punish-
ing resistance to the very change the anti-discrimination laws seek to ac-
complish. To address the shortcomings in courts' current approaches, this
Article has outlined a superior approach that expands the concept of retalia-
tory harassment to include those actions that reasonably seek to deter com-
plaints.
169. While this interpretation also has implications for the standard of employer
liability that should apply in retaliatory harassment cases, that analysis is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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